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Abstract Dubreuil (Biol Phil 25:53–73, 2010b, this journal) argues that modern-
like cognitive abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance most likely
evolved in Homo heidelbergensis, much before the evolution of oft-cited modern
traits, such as symbolism and art. Dubreuil’s argument proceeds in two steps. First,
he identiﬁes two behavioral traits that are supposed to be indicative of the presence
of a capacity for inhibition and goal maintenance: cooperative feeding and coop-
erative breeding. Next, he tries to show that these behavioral traits most likely
emerged in Homo heidelbergensis. In this paper, I show that neither of these steps
are warranted in light of current scientiﬁc evidence, and thus, that the evolutionary
background of human executive functions, such as inhibition and goal maintenance,
remains obscure. Nonetheless, I suggest that cooperative breeding might mark a
crucial step in the evolution of our species: its early emergence in Homo erectus
might have favored a social intelligence that was required to get modernity really
off the ground in Homo sapiens.
Keywords Cooperative breeding  Cooperative feeding  Executive control 
Evolution  Cognition  Human revolution
Introduction
There is a growing trend against the model known as the ‘‘Human Revolution’’,
according to which modern behaviors (such as art and symbolism) emerged
suddenly some 50,000 years ago, an event supposedly signaling a dramatic
cognitive advance, most likely triggered by a reorganization of the human brain
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9286-y(see most notably, McBrearty and Brooks 2000, and the collection of essays in
Mellars et al. 2007). Against the model, scholars in various disciplines nowadays try
to offer an account portraying the evolution of human culture and of human higher
cognitive abilities as gradual, rather than abrupt.
Following this trend, Dubreuil (2010b, this journal) provides an argument meant
to show that two fairly modern behaviors (i.e. human cooperation in matters of
feeding and breeding), supposedly indicative of two fairly high-level cognitive
capacities (i.e. inhibitory control and goal maintenance), can be traced back to
Homo heidelbergensis (700,000–300,000 years ago).
1 If his argument is sound,
Dubreuil indeed has a case against the ‘‘Human Revolution’’, since some forms of
higher-level cognition (c.q. inhibition and goal maintenance) would have been
around some 250,000–650,000 years before the supposed great leap forward.
However, in the next few sections I show that Dubreuil’s argument fails. I do so
in two steps. First, I explain that cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding are
poor indicators of inhibition and goal maintenance (sections ‘‘Cooperative feeding
and executive control’’, ‘‘Cooperative breeding and executive control’’). So even if
one could date the emergence of these two cooperative behaviors (which Dubreuil
fails to do, see the second point), that wouldn’t sufﬁce as evidence for the
emergence of the two higher cognitive traits.
Second, I show that Dubreuil likely misdates the occurrence of human
cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding (section ‘‘When did cooperative
feeding and breeding arise?’’) Science’s best conjecture is that these behaviors arose
in Homo erectus, ca. 1 million years before Homo heidelbergensis.
Both points of course do not imply that the idea of the ‘‘Human Revolution’’ is
true. They do show, however, that Dubreuil’s argument doesn’t provide (extra)
reason to abandon it. Still, I think that cooperative breeding can be used as evidence
against the ‘‘Human Revolution’’, and in the ﬁnal section (‘‘Down with the
revolution?’’) I suggest how.
Cooperative feeding and executive control
According to Dubreuil (2010b), two cooperative foraging strategies stand out as
evidencing increased executive control in the Homo lineage: hunting in group and
extensive food sharing. In both, Dubreuil believes, cooperation is secured by agents’
ability to stick to the cooperative arrangement (i.e. goal maintenance) and the ability
to resist the temptation of acting self-interestedly (i.e. inhibition).
1 A similar argument is found in Dubreuil’s book Human evolution and the origins of hierarchies
(2010a). There, however, the focus is more on joint attention and norm following than on executive
control; and on how these abilities account for the evolution of cooperative feeding and breeding in
humans. Here I will focus on executive control for two reasons: ﬁrst, because Dubreuil’s discussion of
joint attention and norm following has already been criticized by Driscoll (forthcoming; see more below);
and second, given that executive control is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient condition for norm following,
any problem for Dubreuil’s views concerning executive control is de facto a problem for his views
concerning norm following. In light of this, I will refer to Dubreuil’s book only when useful.
116 K. Vaesen
123This seems an intuitively plausible interpretation. Prospective cooperators have
an incentive to consume the public good, without contributing to it. In case of food
sharing, the temptation is to receive food, but not to give away. To secure
cooperation, then, agents must keep in mind the goal and beneﬁts of long-term
sharing relationships (e.g., pooling risks yields a more regular energy intake), and
inhibit the current desire to eat a bit more now, at the expense of eating less later.
In case of hunting the temptation is to drop out early from the hunting coalition
(thereby putting others at a greater risk), yet get hold of a piece of meat. Again, joint
hunting is stable and effective, only if individual hunters stick to the shared goal,
and inhibit impulses to step aside and put themselves in safety (rather than to do
their fair share of stone-throwing and clubbing).
Yet, there are two reasons for thinking that both cooperative behaviors are poor
indicators of inhibition and goal maintenance. The ﬁrst is that cooperative hunting
and food sharing is widely present in our closest relative the chimpanzee, which
lacks advanced, human-like mechanisms for inhibition and goal maintenance. The
second reason is that much simpler cognitive mechanisms may explain cooperative
hunting and food sharing. Let me address these issues each in turn.
Hunting and meat sharing in chimpanzees
Dubreuil acknowledges that joint hunting and meat sharing is present in apes, yet
thinks these practices are not as pervasive as in humans. The advent of cooking and
large-game hunting (presumably in Homo heidelbergensis) has made cooperation in
matters of meat necessary and default, and—so Dubreuil thinks—required
mechanisms for inhibition and goal maintenance (i.e. in humans, but not apes).
Theﬁrstproblemwiththislineofreasoningisthatthehumandietisprobablynotas
meat-based as Dubreuil suggests. In colder climates, meat may perhaps account for a
large fraction of energy intake, in the tropics and the subtropics, many traditional
hunter-gatherersforageprimarilyforplantfoods,andmeatisonlyaverysmallpartof
the overall diet—indeed, just like in our closest relative the chimpanzee (Stanford
2001). Interestingly, Dubreuil (2010a, p. 70, 2010b, p. 60) makes the very same
observation,yet shiesawayfromthe fairlyobviousconsequence: that thenecessityof
sharing may be as large/small for chimps as it is for humans.
But even if one grants that humans cooperate more pervasively, there is a second,
more fundamental problem. The pervasiveness of a practice doesn’t count as extra
evidence for the reality of the mechanisms supposedly subserving it. For an
existential proof, a species-wide observation of the practice sufﬁces—whether or
not the practice is more pervasively present than in another species. For instance,
the fact that subtropical human foragers hunt not as frequently as their colleagues in
cooler climates, doesn’t imply they don’t have the requisite mechanisms for
inhibition and goal maintenance. Rather, subtropical foragers are not as frequent
hunters, most likely because plant foods are more abundantly and reliably available
in subtropical habitats. The crucial fact is that they are able to and do in fact hunt,
not how often they do. In a similar vein, then, the robust, species-wide observation
of joint hunting in chimpanzees (see e.g., the overview of Muller and Mitani 2005),
though less pervasively as in humans, should sufﬁce to demonstrate chimpanzees’
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necessary for joint hunting)—unless Dubreuil can show that human and chimpanzee
hunting are qualitatively (rather than quantitatively) different, and additionally, a
much harder nut to crack, that that qualitative difference is attributable to a
difference in capacities for executive control.
2
Now,inhisdetailedcomparisonofhuntingpracticesoftraditionalhunter-gatherers
and chimpanzees, Stanford (2001) ﬁnds seven such qualitative differences. But only
one of these directly links to cooperation: whereas cooperation in chimpanzees just
involves increased numerical strength, cooperation in human hunters is actively
coordinated through vocal and/or gestural communication. Inasmuch as prehistoric
hunterscanbemodeledoncontemporarytraditionalhunters,itwouldbemorenatural
to argue that human cooperative hunting depends on improved communicative
abilities, rather than on better executive control (inhibition, goal maintenance).
Stanford also observes a difference that indirectly links to cooperation. Humans
bring back their (excess) returns to share with individuals not present at the kill;
chimpanzees, in contrast, eat and share meat from hand to mouth on the spot.
Whether this difference attests to a difference in executive control cannot be taken
for granted, though, for differences in locomotion (bipedal vs. quadrupedal) provide
a much more parsimious explanation for the lack of meat transportation in chimps,
and consequently for their smaller networks of exchange.
Incidentally, Dubreuil (2010a, p. 71) observes that chimpanzees are not as fond
of sharing as humans. Yet again, it remains to be shown that this difference is due to
a difference in executive functions. Plausibly, in order to be able to share, sharing-
averse individuals need more inhibitory control than individuals endowed with a
spontaneous prosocial psychology.
Finally, meat sharing in chimpanzees can be reconstructed in terms of inhibition
and goal maintenance just as easily as meat sharing in humans. According to a ﬁrst
common explanation of chimp meat sharing, meat is shared with others to build and
strengthen social bonds (de Waal 1998); according to a second, males share meat
with females, and hope to get sex in return (Stanford et al. 1994; Stanford 1996).
Here is the reconstruction: on both accounts, current appetite is suppressed for a
future goal (strategic and reproductive, respectively).
To be sure, I don’t deny that contemporary humans outperform chimpanzees in
matters of executive control, since there is ample evidence that they do (for an
overview, Vaesen, forthcoming). Still, the idea that cooperative feeding can be used
as an evolutionary marker of this cognitive divergence, as Dubreuil suggests, does
not stand ﬁrm in light of the above.
3
2 Another possibility is to argue that human and chimpanzee hunting are qualitatively similar, but are
produced by different mechanisms (in humans, through executive control, in chimpanzees, through
something else). This is a reasonable suggestion (which will be discussed more fully in the section
‘‘Alternative cognitive explanations of hunting and food sharing’’). Yet, it will not help Dubreuil. If
cooperative feeding may be realized by mechanisms other than executive control, its discriminating
power is too low to qualify as an evolutionary indicator of executive control.
3 Even if chimpanzees did not involve in cooperative feeding practices at all, cooperative feeding would
be a good indicator of the emergence of inhibition and goal maintenance in humans, only if chimpanzees
didn’t involve in any other cooperative behaviors requiring inhibition and goal maintenance.
Chimpanzees, however, are known to cooperate on many non-food issues (e.g., social grooming,
118 K. Vaesen
123Alternative cognitive explanations of hunting and food sharing
While it may be convenient to reconstruct cooperative feeding practices in terms of
inhibition and goal maintenance, it is a mistake to think that only such sophisticated
future-oriented attitudes offer a plausible explanation. Cognitively undemanding
backward-looking mechanisms may perform as good—and, even better.
For example, chimpanzees commonly involve in reciprocal relationships (e.g., in
matters of food sharing, social grooming, agonistic support, territorial defense)
notwithstanding their poor inhibitory control, and notwithstanding their inability to
foresee future events. The most plausible explanation for chimp reciprocation, then,
is that it is motivated by past altruism received, rather than by the expectation of
future rewards (Schino and Aureli 2009, see also, de Waal 2000). According to
Schino and Aureli, a simple mechanism of ‘‘emotional bookkeeping’’ sufﬁces here:
chimpanzees make decisions on whether to act altruistically towards a partner based
on emotions associated with previous encounters with that partner. Emotions, not
reasoned projections, guide social interactions.
Another primate example concerns marmoset and tamarin monkeys. These
cooperatively breeding species are known to spontaneously share foodstuffs with
their own offspring and the offspring of others, to act prosocially even with
unrelated others (for tamarins: see Hauser et al. 2003; for marmosets: see Burkart
et al. 2007), and to cooperate when harvesting and processing large fruits (Garber
1997). In general, marmosets and tamarins engage in cooperative feeding more
spontaneously and generously than chimpanzees. Given that marmosets and
tamarins are relatively small-brained, and given that they do not outperform their
independently breeding sister taxa (e.g., squirrel monkeys) with respect to inhibitory
control and working memory (Burkart et al. 2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010),
there is good reason to think that their cooperative feeding practices do not trade on
high-level cognitive abilities. The most plausible explanation for marmoset and
tamarin cooperation is a simple and spontaneous prosocial psychology.
Such cognitively undemanding prosocial machinery arguably guides much of
reciprocal altruism even in modern humans (Schino and Aureli 2010). An emotion
as gratitude, for instance, is a potent motivator for subsequent altruism. In light of
this, and in light of marmoset/tamarin prosociality, affect-based explanations for
cooperative feeding in Homo heidelbergensis seem at least as plausible as
explanations in terms of executive control.
In sum, the multiple realizability of cooperative feeding is bad news for Dubreuil.
Cooperative feeding is too coarse-grained to mark unequivocally the emergence of
increased abilities for inhibition and goal maintenance. So even if one could
accurately date its occurrence in the early human lineage, that wouldn’t show that
humans got cognitively more sophisticated at that point. And, unfortunately, the
same kind of argument holds for cooperative breeding—a topic I turn to now.
Footnote 3 continued
territorial defense, attacking enemies); and these behaviors may all be reconstructed (just like hunting and
food sharing) in terms of inhibition and goal maintenance.
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In cooperative breeding systems, some individuals actively engage in caring and
provisioning infants that are not their own. Clearly, humans are cooperative breeders
in this sense. For example, a large fraction of the 13 million calories that are needed
to rear a modern human from birth to maturity (approx. age 15–16) is provided not by
the mother, but by other caregivers, both kin and non-kin (Hrdy 2009). The delayed
maturity characteristic of humans, and the unusually short intervals between births,
makes indispensable the aid of fathers, older siblings, aunts, uncles and even
unrelated others. Thus, Dubreuil is right that human cooperative childcare implies
huge transfers of resources. But again, it is a mistake to think that such transfers can
be secured ‘only once individuals [are] able to represent and ascribe value to long-
term cooperative goals [i.e. goal maintenance], as well as to resist the temptation of
defection on a daily basis [i.e. inhibition].’ (Dubreuil 2010b, p. 62)
To start, it is questionable whether cooperative breeding drives on long-term
cooperation at all. Dubreuil thinks it is: adults invest so much in children, because
children ‘are generally expected to provide support for parents in their old age, as
well as to help build economic and political alliances’ (Dubreuil 2010a, p. 75). In
other words, the beneﬁts children receive now are paid back only several years later.
For care by kin, however, no such extra return on investment is needed; parents
and other kin have a genetic interest in helping related infants. In case of non-kin
breeding assistance, investments by helpers can usually be explained in terms of
short-term beneﬁts. According to a review by Bergmu ¨ller et al. (2007), helpers may
help raise non-related infants to gain parenting experience; to avoid expulsion from
the territory of the breeders they are assisting; to avoid expulsion from the group; to
beneﬁt from group augmentation effects (e.g. safety in numbers effects); or to
advertise their genetic quality and thereby gain social prestige and perhaps increase
future mating opportunities. The authors also mention the theoretical possibility of
non-kin long-term cooperation sensu Dubreuil; but note that conclusive evidence for
it is currently lacking.
Importantly, even if beneﬁts for kin and non-kin caregivers are situated in the
future, that doesn’t imply that care is motivated by future gain. Future gain may
operate at the level of ultimate causes, without ﬁguring at the proximate (i.e.
motivational) level. de Waal (2008) gives the example of the honeybee that stings
an intruder. That altruistic behavior has been selected for its long-term ﬁtness
consequences, yet is motivated by anger, rather than by predictions of future events.
The same applies to cooperative breeding in marmosets and tamarins. These
monkeys typically live in family groups composed of a breeding pair, its dependent
offspring and helpers (Burkart and van Schaik 2010). Helpers include older siblings,
members of the extended family, and unrelated others, some of which get
reproductively inactive to serve the reproductively active pair (Digby et al. 2007).
Help encompasses infant carrying, food sharing, babysitting, and even allonursing.
4
4 Cooperative childcare in marmosets and tamarins is a response not so much to long childhoods as to a
remarkable fecundity: twins and triplets are common, and females often produce two litters per year
(Garber 1997).
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alloparental caregivers and infant survival rates (Hrdy 2009). In sum, in tamarin
and marmoset groups, substantial transfers of resources take place. Yet, as
mentioned above, these monkeys are fairly modest-brained, and have no increased
abilities for inhibition and working memory. So at the proximate level, tamarin and
marmoset other-regarding behavior is likely not motivated by expectations of future
reciprocation, but rather by simple and spontaneous helping impulses. If Dubreuil
thinks this is different for humans, for Homo heidelbergensis in particular, he
deﬁnitely needs to tell us why.
What about Dubreuil’s suggestion (2010a, p. 81) that cooperative breeding
requires increased inhibitory control to allow individuals to conform to sexual
norms? These sexual norms (e.g., norms of monogamy), Dubreuil argues, see to it
that males living in multimale groups can assess paternity with relative conﬁdence,
which decreases the risk that they invest in infants which are not their own. Dubreuil
thus sees high paternal certainty as a necessary condition for the evolution of
paternal care; and conformance to sexual norms as the most salient way of
increasing paternal certainty. Both assumptions are problematic. First, low paternal
certainty is consistent with high male-infant care. Saddle-back tamarins, mous-
tached tamarins, lion tamarins, black-capped capuchins, olive baboons, chacma
baboons, barbary macaques, stumptail macaques, Japanese macaques all live in
multimale polyandrous groups, thus face high paternal uncertainty, yet all exhibit
high male investment (Smuts and Gubernick 1992). These investments are likely
motivated by the beneﬁts Bergmu ¨ller discerns (see above). Second, social norms are
a fairly expensive way of increasing paternal certainty. Much less-demanding
solutions include concealed ovulation (even if just exapted for that purpose), a
natural aversion to casual sex in females, mechanisms of pair-bonding and of
female-female competition, or a combination of these (see e.g., Geary 2000).
To sum up the previous sections: cooperative feeding and breeding are poor
indicators of inhibition and goal maintenance.
5 They are not particular to humans,
and moreover may be realized by fairly undemanding cognitive traits. In addition, it
is doubtful that Dubreuil dates cooperative feeding and breeding in humans
correctly—the next section explains why.
When did cooperative feeding and breeding arise?
Let me start with Dubreuil’s timing of cooperative breeding. Cooperative breeding
scholars commonly estimate that cooperative breeding arose with Homo erectus, ca.
1.8 Ma—rather than with Homo heidelbergensis (700 kya), as Dubreuil has it.
van Schaik and Burkart (2010) summarize several convincing lines of argument.
First, cooperative breeding is favored where successful dispersal is difﬁcult, and
infant helping positively affects survival rates. The idea is that novel habitats ask for
5 In my opinion, much better indicators are long distance trade (150–200 kya), the colonization of Sahul
(45 kya) and, as Coolidge and Wynn (2005) point out, technologies like traps and deadfalls (which
obviously do not preserve well in the archaeological record).
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be assisted, so as to bridge the food scarcity in between colonization and their
development of the appropriate skills. Homo erectus, now, colonized two novel
habitats—i.e. savanna habitats and habitats outside Africa—and as such, faced
unpredictability with respect to food availability twice. Moreover, following an
argument of Hawkes & O’Connell and colleagues, shifts toward cooler and drier
climates around 1.8 mya decreased the availability of easy-to-process foods. Infants
would have had to rely more on foods harvested and pre-processed by others, most
notably, their grandmothers (O’Connell et al. 1999; Hawkes et al. 2000).
Second, body size of Homo erectus was much larger than that of earlier
hominins. One reasonable solution to the increased reproductive burden for females
was cooperative breeding, with energetic inputs being provisioned to infants by
mothers and allomothers.
In a similar vein, third, hominin brain size clearly exceeded that of the great ape
range for the ﬁrst time in Homo erectus (Schoenemann 2006). Energetic inputs
provided by others may have enabled this marked increase. This is consistent with
the idea that larger brains ask for longer maturation times, which external aid would
again have made possible.
The timing of cooperative breeding in Homo erectus has ramiﬁcations for the
timing of cooperative feeding too, since cooperative breeding implies cooperative
feeding almost per deﬁnition (Driscoll, forthcoming). Sharing food with (un)related
infants is the paradigmatic example of cooperative childcare. True, cooperative
breeding doesn’t imply large game hunting; and that practice perhaps appeared
indeed with Homo heidelbergensis.
Down with the revolution?
Dubreuil’s argument was supposed to show that human cooperation and culture did
not evolve in one step (ca. 50 kya, with the advent of symbolism and culture), but
developed gradually, with modern-like abilities for inhibition and goal maintenance
already appearing with Homo heidelbergensis. I have shown that Dubreuil’s
argument is unsatisfactory: cooperative feeding and breeding do not need to mark
enhanced abilities for inhibition and goal maintenance, and cooperative feeding and
breeding most likely arose long before Homo heidelbergensis.
Nonetheless, I think there is still room to deploy cooperative breeding (in
particular) against the idea of the ‘‘Human Revolution’’. This has to do with the
ﬁnding that cooperative breeding primates, presumably given their strong reliance
on others, outperform their independently breeding sister taxa in socio-cognitive
tasks (but not in non-social cognitive tasks, like those mentioned by Dubreuil
2010b).
6 That is, in their systematic review of the literature, Burkart and van Schaik
(2010, see also, Burkart et al. 2009) explain that cooperatively breeding tamarins
and marmosets are better than their independently breeding sister taxa with respect
6 Dubreuil (2010a) tries a similar idea: cooperative breeding marks enhanced capacities for joint
attention and norm following.
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ing, cooperative problem solving (but not with respect to: general cognitive ability,
working memory of actions, innovation rates, tool-use rates, patience, and inhibitory
control). Burkart et al. (2009) argue that such social intelligence is as much a
necessary ingredient for human cooperation and culture as the general intelligence
commonly invoked. They suggest that when both intelligences were combined
(from Homo erectus onward), the divergence between humans and apes really gets
going. In other words, an increase in general intelligence, as usually implied in the
model of the ‘‘Human Revolution’’, could be powerful only given a set of previous
innovations, including (reﬁnements to) a suite of socio-cognitive skills that
accompanied (reﬁnements to) cooperative breeding practices. Modernity might have
taken off with Homo erectus, rather than with Homo sapiens.
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